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REGULATION BY GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED
REINSURANCE IN CATASTROPHE MANAGEMENT
QIHAO HE

I.

INTRODUCTION

For over a century, reinsurance has been the preferred vehicle to
shed primary insurers’ catastrophe risk exposure. 1 The Cologne
Reinsurance Company was the first professional reinsurance company,
founded in 1842 following a catastrophic fire in Hamburg the same year.2
Insurers have an increasing demand for more financial capacity when
underwriting catastrophic risks. For example, reinsurers paid primary
insurers 60 percent of the insured losses from the September 11 terrorist
attacks, 65 percent from Hurricane Katrina, and 40 percent from Hurricane
Sandy more recently.3
With respect to catastrophic risks, reinsurance’s role takes several
forms. Reinsurance can take a significant portion of the insured losses from
primary insurers, diversify catastrophe risks globally, supply underwriting
assistance, and regulate insurers’ behavior to promote risk mitigation.4
*Associate Professor of Law, China University of Political Science and Law
(CUPL), Beijing, China. Visiting Scholar, Boston College Law School &
University of Pennsylvania Law School; S.J.D., LL.M (Honors) in Insurance Law,
University of Connecticut School of Law.
1
Rajna Gibson, Michel A. Habib, & Alexandre Ziegler, Financial Markets,
Reinsurance, and the Bearing of Natural Catastrophe Risk, SWISS FIN. INST., U.
ZURICH 1, 2 (2007), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228810986_
Financial_Markets_Reinsurance_and_the_Bearing_of_Natural_Catastrophe_Risk.
2
An Introduction to Reinsurance, SWISS RE (July 12, 2002),
http://www.swissre.com/publications/An_introduction_to_reinsurance.htm.
3
FED. INS. OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE BREADTH AND SCOPE OF THE
GLOBAL REINSURANCE MARKET AND THE CRITICAL ROLE SUCH MARKET PLAYS IN
SUPPORTING
INSURANCE
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
15
(2014),
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports-and-notices/Documents/FIO%20-%
20Reinsurance%20Report.pdf.
4
See generally Marcos Antonio Mendoza, Reinsurance as Governance:
Governmental Risk Management Pools as a Case Study in the Governance Role
Played by Reinsurance Institutions, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 53 (2014); Aviva
Abramovsky, Reinsurance: The Silent Regulator?, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 345, 346,
373 (2009); Veronique Bruggeman, Michael Faure & Tobias Heldt, Insurance
Against Catastrophe: Government Stimulation of Insurance Markets for
Catastrophic Events, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 185, 186 (2012); VÉRONIQUE
BRUGGEMAN, COMPENSATING CATASTROPHE VICTIMS: A COMPARATIVE LAW AND
ECONOMICS APPROACH 130 (2010); David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser,
Reinsurance for Catastrophes and Cataclysms, in THE FINANCING OF
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These roles often go beyond risk transfer and risk financing and expand to
risk regulation for primary insurers. The former role has been discussed at
length in law and economics literature,5 but regulation by reinsurance has
not been widely discussed and has even qualified as problematic.
Moreover, private reinsurance has come under scrutiny due to catastrophe
insurance cycles that may lead to insurance unavailability and excessive
prices, especially after a major event.6
Government-sponsored reinsurance, which marries the merits of both
the government and private reinsurance, has gained increasing attention in
the law and economics literature, and these programs have increased
substantially in practice. Many countries use government-sponsored
reinsurance to address catastrophe risks, including France (Caisse Centrale
de Réassurance), Australia (Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation),
Japan (Japan Earthquake Reinsurance Co., Ltd.), Turkey (Turkish
Catastrophe
Insurance
Pool),
Netherlands
(Nederlandse
Herverzekeringsmaatschappij voor Terrorismeschaden), Thailand (National
Catastrophe Insurance Fund), United States (Terrorism Risk Insurance
Program and the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund), Belgium (Caisse
nationale des Calamités and the Terrorism Reinsurance and Insurance Pool),
and Denmark (Terrorism Insurance Pool for Non-Life Insurance). 7 Most
of the reinsurance programs cover natural disasters. Meanwhile, many
questions about those government-sponsored reinsurance programs have
been raised. Why does the government adopt reinsurance as an intervention
tool for catastrophe risks? Why might the government be motivated to
structure its financial support in this manner rather than in others, such as
providing direct compensation to victims of catastrophes? How could the
reinsurance industry help regulate catastrophe insurers? How well have
government-sponsored reinsurance programs worked? And have
government-sponsored reinsurance programs resulted in any unintended
CATASTROPHE RISK 254 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1999); FED. INS. OFF., U.S. DEP’T
OF TREASURY, supra note 3, at 1.
5
Many articles are discussing reinsurance as risk transfer and compensation
to catastrophes victims. See Véronique Bruggeman, Michael G. Faure & Karine
Fiore, The Government as Reinsurer of Catastrophe Risks?, 35 THE GENEVA
PAPERS ON RISK AND INS.-ISSUES AND PRACTICE 369, 378 (2010); David Durbin,
Managing Natural Catastrophe Risks: The Structure and Dynamics of Reinsurance,
26 THE GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INS.-ISSUES AND PRACTICE 297 (2001);
Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 237; J. David Cummins, Reinsurance for
Natural and Man-Made Catastrophes in the United States: Current State of the
Market and Regulatory Reforms, 10 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 179, 193 (2007).
6
Durbin, supra note 5, at 297-300.
7
Bruggeman, et al., supra note 4.
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consequences?
To discuss all these questions is not possible within the scope of
this Article. This Article will mainly argue why the Chinese government
should adopt government-sponsored reinsurance and how to expand
regulation by reinsurance to achieve optimal catastrophe risk management.
The Article begins by introducing basic principles of reinsurance. Next, the
Article explores the main regulatory techniques of reinsurance which offer
primary insurers incentives to underwrite appropriately and mitigate risk.
Then, the Article discusses reasons why the private reinsurance market
cannot provide adequate coverage for catastrophe risks and the arguments
for government-sponsored reinsurance. Next, the Article examines and
compares several typical government-sponsored reinsurance programs,
including programs in France (Caisse Centrale de Réassurance (CCR)),
Japan (Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance Scheme (JERS)), and Turkey
(Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP)), in which primary insurers
are regulated by reinsurance. Finally, the Article argues that China should
adopt government-sponsored reinsurance to address catastrophe risks, and
the possibility and feasibility of regulation by government-sponsored
reinsurance in China is addressed.
II.

REINSURANCE BASICS
A.

INTRODUCTION OF REINSURANCE

Reinsurance can be understood simply as insurers’ insurance.
Under an insurance contract, a policyholder is protected from loss by
transferring risk to an insurer; analogously, under a reinsurance contract, an
insurer (the cedent or ceding company) is protected from exposure by
transferring risk to a reinsurer.8 From the demand perspective, there are
many theoretical explanations for a primary insurer’s decision to purchase
reinsurance. For example, Hoerger, Sloan, and Hassan consider that the
motive for reinsuring is to avoid bankruptcy, even for an insurer that is not
averse to risk (a risk-neutral insurer).9 According to other explanations,
insurers demand reinsurance if they face catastrophic losses, insufficient

FED. INS. OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 3, at 1.
They use their model to assess how the insurer’s surplus, size, and volatility
of losses affect the amount of reinsurance the primary insurer purchases. See
generally Thomas J. Hoerger, Frank A. Sloan & Mahmud Hassan, Loss Volatility,
Bankruptcy, and Insurer Demand for Reinsurance, 3 J. OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY
221, 221-222, 225 (1990).
8
9
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underwriting capacity, higher loss volatility, lower surplus-to-premium
ratios, or in the course of retiring from a territory or class of business.10
From the supply perspective, reinsurance is available from many
sources, both domestic and abroad. The providers generally include
professional reinsurers, pools and syndicates, direct insurers, and
government agencies, which are not mutually exclusive.11 For example,
many direct insurers are legally empowered to sell reinsurance, and they
still purchase extra reinsurance from foreign professional reinsurers.
There are two broad categories of reinsurance agreements: treaty
reinsurance and facultative reinsurance. Treaty reinsurance covers broad
groups of policies and binds the cedent to cede a specific portion of the risk
of an entire class of business, such as all property coverage written by the
cedents, to a reinsurer through one contract. 12 Compared to treaty
reinsurance, facultative reinsurance is often used to cover specific and
catastrophic risks13 because facultative reinsurance allows reinsurers to
engage in significant underwriting prior to placing the policy and enables
primary insurers to spread the risks of catastrophic losses that would
otherwise be beyond their underwriting capacity.14
B.

REINSURANCE FOR CATASTROPHE INSURERS

In the property-casualty market, the role of reinsurance is more
apparent following catastrophes than after other perils. Catastrophes have a
low probability of occurrence but cause very significant human and
financial losses. Insurers are reluctant to underwrite catastrophes and even
exclude these risks from coverage. The general theoretical explanation for
why primary insurers do not cover catastrophe losses is that losses from
these events are too large and too highly correlated for insurers to bear

KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 739 (2005); Patrick Brockett, Robert C. Witt & Paul R. Aird, An
Overview of Reinsurance and the Reinsurance Markets, 9 J. OF INS. REG. 432
(1991); BERNARD L. WEBB, CONNOR M. HARRISON & JAMES J. MARKHAM,
INSURANCE OPERATIONS 2 (1997).
11
Bernard L. Webb, Reinsurance as a Social Tool, in 1 ISSUES IN INS. 403,
413-414 (Everett D. Randall ed., 1987).
12
BARRY R. OSTRAGER & MARY KAY VYSKOCIL, MODERN REINSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE 2-4 to 2-7 (2d ed. 2000).
13
ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 1016-1018 (4th ed.
2007); GRAYDON S. STARING, THE LAW OF REINSURANCE 14-16 (2015).
14
BARRY OSTRAGER & THOMAS NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE DISPUTES 991 (12th ed. 2004).
10
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them.15 For primary insurers, losses from catastrophes do not satisfy the
conditions of statistical independence and hence are not locally insurable.16
Reinsurance plays a major role in making catastrophes insurable and serves
an important function as protection against the accumulation of losses from
catastrophes.17 For reinsurers, because of their ability to diversify globally,
catastrophe risks can be characterized as globally insurable.18 For example,
the risk of hurricanes in the United States is independent of the risk of
earthquake in China. This provides the economic motivation for reinsurers
to aggregate catastrophe risks over geographic regions and different
catastrophe lines.19 By diversifying losses across the world, catastrophes
may not impose unbearable losses on the reinsurer when compared to its
overall book of business, making it possible for reinsurers to provide
coverage and pay losses.20
While primary insurance tends to be a local business, reinsurance is
more of an international business, especially for catastrophic risks.21 For
example, in 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused around $90 billion in insured
property losses in the United States, of which non-US reinsurers paid
approximately $59 billion.22 Because US primary insurers can access the
global reinsurance market, they are able to provide coverage and pay

“When losses are highly correlated, insurers’ claims experience is expected
to be lumpy – the presence of one claim implies a likelihood of many claims.
Several years may result in no claims, but some years will have gigantic levels of
claims, and the strain of being prepared for a disaster year means insurers must
either charge high premiums, or face the risk of bankruptcy. The conventional
wisdom is that insurers choose to exclude these risks from coverage, rather than
expose themselves to the year-to-year uncertainty endemic to correlated risks.” See
Peter Molk, Private Versus Public Insurance for Natural Hazards: Individual
Behavior's Role in Loss Mitigation, in RISK ANALYSIS OF NATURAL HAZARDS
(Paolo Gardoni et al. eds., Springer, 2015); see also Jerry, II, supra note 13;
ABRAHAM, supra note 10.
16
Cummins, supra note 5, at 181-182.
17
FED. INS. OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 3, at 1.
18
Dwight Jaffee, Catastrophe Insurance, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW, 166-167 (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman
eds., 2015).
19
Id.
20
Cummins, supra note 5, at 182.
21
Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 237.
22
GLOBAL REINSURANCE FORUM, GLOBAL REINSURANCE: STRENGTHENING
DISASTER RISK RESILIENCE, 8, 11 (2014), https://www.hannover-re.com/306809/
global-reinsurance-forum-grf-report-2014.pdf.
15
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claims.23 The United States is not an isolated example; reinsurers have
assumed a large portion of insured natural catastrophe losses in the world.
For example, in 2011, global insured catastrophe losses reached $110
billion, and reinsurers assumed more than half (Figure 3). The largest
reinsurers are in Europe and the Caribbean and are not confined to
domestic reinsurers.24
In addition, reinsurers have developed new products such as
catastrophe bonds, catastrophe derivatives, contingent capital, sidecars, and
other hybrid products to facilitate new capital flows from the capital market
into the reinsurance market.25 As a result, capital in the reinsurance market
has generally been increasing year-over-year for most of the past decade
(Figure 2). 26 For example, as of mid-2014, global reinsurance capital
amounted to $570 billion ($511 billion is classified as traditional capital
and $59 billion as alternative capital).27 This accessible outside capital
enables reinsurers to assume more insured catastrophe losses.

Cummins, supra note 5, at 184.
Europe is the origin of reinsurance business, and in Europe, the insurance
tax laws do allow tax-deductible reserves against future losses. In the Caribbean, a
number of countries have created special tax havens. See Jaffee, supra note 18, at
167.
25
Catastrophe bonds are risked-linked securities that transfer catastrophe risks
from insurers to investors through fully-collateralized special purpose vehicles
(SPV). Catastrophe derivatives are financial contracts used to spread catastrophe
risk to capital market investors that derive value from the value of financial
instruments, events or conditions; for example, the event can be a wind storm
making landfall within a certain distance of a given location. A contingent capital
arrangement is a type of financing that is arranged before a loss occurs. Sidecars
are special purpose vehicles formed by insurance and reinsurance companies to
provide additional capacity to write reinsurance, usually for property catastrophes
and marine risks. See Partner Re, A Balanced Discussion on Insurance
Linked-Securities (2008), www.partnerre.com; Cummins, supra note 5, at 195.
26
Cummins, supra note 5, at 193-194.
27
AON BENFIELD, THE AON BENFIELD AGGREGATE 3 (2014),
http://thoughtleadership.aonbenfield.com/Documents/201409_aba_1h_2014.pdf.
23
24
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Figure 1. Catastrophe risk transfer in the international reinsurance
market, 201128

28
Sebastian Von Dahlen & Goetz Von Peter, Natural Catastrophes and
Global Reinsurance–Exploring the Linkages, 2012 BIS Q. REV. 23, 27 (Dec. 10,
2012), http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1212e.pdf.
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Figure 2. Global reinsurer capital, 2006–201429

III.

REGULATORY ACTIVITIES OF REINSURANCE

In many respects, reinsurance often goes beyond pure risk transfer
and expands to help solve catastrophic risk management issues through
serving as an enforcer of compliance with government regulations and
reinsurance contracts.30 A major difficulty with catastrophe reinsurance is
moral hazard, a problem also encountered by primary insurance vis-à-vis
policyholders. It is logical for primary insurers to change their behavior as
soon as the risk is fully ceded to the reinsurer. As a private regulator,
reinsurance provides incentives for the primary insurers to engage in
mitigation and prevention of catastrophe losses, and thus reduce moral
hazard. Reinsurance has a direct and significant impact on the business
operation of primary insurance and even an indirect impact on the insureds,
from contract design such as pricing, through underwriting and issuing of a
AON BENFIELD, THE AON BENFIELD AGGREGATE: RESULTS FOR THE SIX
MONTHS ENDED JUNE 30, 2014, 3 (2014), http://thoughtleadership.aonbenfield.com/
29

Documents/201409_aba_1h_2014.pdf.
30
Guido Funke, The Munich Re View on Climate-Change Litigation, in
LIABILITY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE? EXPERTS’ VIEWS ON A POTENTIAL EMERGING
RISK 22, 23 (Munich Re 2010); Lawrence Samplatsky, The Role of Reinsurance in
Life Insurance Industry 23 (2003) (unpublished LLM master thesis, University of
Connecticut) (on file with author).
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policy, and ending with agreeing or refusing to pay for a claim.31 This part
introduces four main tools that almost all reinsurers use to one degree or
another to control moral hazard: loss-sensitive premiums, the duty of
utmost good faith, providing risk management service, and indirect
regulation of insureds. To be clear, I do not contend that these activities will
exclusively solve moral hazard, nor do I contend that moral hazard
management provides an adequate description for addressing catastrophe
risk. However, by supplying both the incentive and the know-how that
primary insurers often lack, reinsurance can realize value enhancing.
A.

LOSS-SENSITIVE PREMIUMS

Catastrophes usually cause numerous claims at the same time.
Insurers tend to pass on correlated losses to their reinsurers and thus the
moral hazard problem becomes severe.32 Traditionally, reinsurers could
control moral hazard by monitoring primary insurers’ business operations,
including their underwriting activities and claims settlements. More
importantly, reinsurers could use loss-sensitive premiums to control moral
hazard. Loss-sensitive premiums generally refer to the situation where “the
price of reinsurance is sensitive to concurrent reinsurance losses and to the
prior period’s losses total and reinsured losses.”33 Loss-sensitive premiums
require that reinsurance premiums should reflect an actuarially fair cost and
integrate into general techniques like deductibles, co-payments, and “ex
post settling up.”34 Neil Doherty and Kent Smetters have proved that
reinsurers can control moral hazard effectively by using loss-sensitive
premiums when the insurers and reinsurers are not affiliates (i.e., not part
of the same financial group).35 They present a multiperiod principal-agent
model of the reinsurance transaction and test it empirically. They find
strong evidence for the use of loss-sensitive premiums when the insurer and
reinsurer are not affiliates, and their results show that price controls can
limit moral hazard. 36 Since insurers and reinsurers are generally not

Mendoza, supra note 4; Abramovsky, supra note 4; Samplatsky, supra note
30, at 23.
32
Neil Doherty & Kent Smetters, Moral Hazard in Reinsurance Markets, 72 J.
OF RISK AND INS. 375 (2005).
33
Id. at 382.
34
Id. at 375-376; Loss-sensitive premium is also called the actuarially fair
premium, or risk-based pricing. See Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 260.
35
Doherty & Smetters, supra note 32.
36
Id.
31
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affiliates in underwriting catastrophe risks,37 using loss-sensitive premiums
is an effective regulatory tool for reinsurers to control moral hazard.
Is using loss-sensitive premiums feasible in practice? The answer
could be yes, thanks to risk-sharing mechanisms developed by reinsurance
and less rate regulation in reinsurance transactions. First, several effective
risk-sharing mechanisms are often introduced for catastrophe reinsurance
premium design. The first one is retrospective rating, which adjusts
premiums based on losses incurred during the policy period.38 The second
one is experience rating, which adjusts premiums based on losses in
previous periods and which is useful when retrospective rating is not
available.39 Furthermore, although catastrophe perils are relatively rare,
when series data on losses and claims is missing, the alternative method is
using exposure-based modeling, which relies on scientific information and
expert opinion; claims experience is only used to check and calibrate the
model.40 Second, compared to primary insurance, reinsurance markets are
lightly regulated except in a few countries such as the United Kingdom,
where reinsurers are regulated in the same way as direct insurers.41
B.

THE DUTY OF UTMOST GOOD FAITH

Primary insurers’ duty of utmost good faith is the core principle of
the reinsurance relationship.42 Utmost good faith is an expressive phrase
borrowed from Roman law, uberrima fides, which is defined as the “most
abundant good faith; absolute and perfect candor or openness and honesty;
the absence of any concealment or deception, however slight.” 43 The
reinsurance premium is less than the primary insurance premium;
otherwise, primary insurers would have no incentives to underwrite such
risk. Thus reinsurers cannot duplicate the costly but necessary efforts of the
primary insurer in evaluating risks and handling claims. Through obligating

See id. at 378 (“Insurance of natural catastrophes is often undertaken by
regional or national primary insurers and reinsured by national or international
reinsurance firms.”).
38
Id. at 375-376.
39
Id. at 382-384.
40
SWISS RE, UNDERSTANDING REINSURANCE: HOW REINSURERS CREATE
VALUE AND MANAGE RISK
12 (2005), http://www.grahambishop.com/
DocumentStore/SwissRe%20Understanding%20reinsurance.pdf.
41
Cummins, supra note 5, at 201.
42
See BARRY R. OSTRAGER & MARY KAY VYSKOCIL, MODERN REINSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE 91 (2014).
43
Utmost Good Faith, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
37
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primary insurers to act in good faith, reinsurers can control moral hazard
through “invisible” monitoring without high cost.44
The duty of utmost good faith requires the primary insurer to
disclose all material facts which may affect the subject risk. 45 Those
material facts may include the reinsured’s underwriting process; the
reinsured’s amendment, renewal, or commutation in the placing of
reinsurance; the payment of claims; and whether risks have been ceded
fraudulently contrary to a treaty or representations.46 As one court has
stated, “[I]nsurance authorities are agreed that a ceding company, which is
in possession of all the details relating to the risk, is required to exercise the
utmost good faith in all its dealings with the reinsurer.”47 This places the
reinsurer in the same position as the reinsured “to give him the same means
and opportunity of judging…the value of risks.”48 To be notable, utmost
good faith requires the insurer to provide timely notice of claim in some
courts,49 because it permits the reinsurer “to reserve properly, to adjust
premiums to reflect the loss experience under the reinsurance contract, and
to decide whether to exercise the option of becoming associated with the
ceding insurer in the handling and disposition of the claim.”50
As the core principle of the reinsurance relationship, the utmost
good faith is enforced by many mechanisms. The first mechanism is the
specific reinsurance contract provisions. It is a kind of private legislation
since the parties to the reinsurance contract are sufficiently sophisticated.
For example, reinsurers often include the “audit and inspection clauses” in
the reinsurance contract which require “the reinsured’s records relative to
the contract sessions to be always open to the reinsurer at reasonable
times.”51 Such clauses guarantee and protect reinsurers’ access to their
reinsured’s underwriting and claims handling practices. The second
In the reference to utmost good faith as the “invisible” monitoring force,
the concept is borrowed from the metaphor of “the invisible hand” used by Adam
Smith in economics.
45
STEVEN PLITT, ET AL., 1A COUCH ON INSURANCE § 9:17, at 82-83 (3d ed.
2010).
46
STARING, supra note 13, at 151-152.
47
Nw. Mut. Fire Ass'n v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Providence, 144 F.2d
274, 276 (9th Cir. 1944) (requiring disclosure of all material facts).
48
Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ocean Ins. Co., 107 U.S. 485, 510 (1883).
49
See e.g., Fortress Re, Inc. v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 333 (E.D.N.C.
1978), aff'd, 628 F.2d 860 (4th Cir. 1980); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 773 F.2d
15 (1st Cir. 1985).
50
BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE DISPUTES, § 16.02, at 563 (5th ed. 1992).
51
STARING, supra note 13, § 15:8, at 333-334.
44
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mechanism is court enforcement. The court often recognizes that primary
insurers’ failure to act in utmost good faith offers the reinsurer a defense to
its reinsurance obligation. 52 More importantly, the court requires of
primary insurers such behavior as a condition precedent to reinsurers’
performance of indemnity obligation. 53 In the case of catastrophes in
which reinsurance is triggered by extremely large dollar-value claims,
primary insurers will undoubtedly take the enforcement of utmost good
faith into serious consideration. A third mechanism by which reinsurance
promotes efficiency is longer-term relationship controls. Reinsurance is
generally not a one-off deal but conducted as a long-term relationship.
Long-term relationships bond both parties, and the reinsurer can increase
the effectiveness of its monitoring because the reinsurer can use past
experience to set future prices and terms, or even to refuse to underwrite.54
C.

PROVIDING RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICE

Reinsurers can act not only as capital suppliers but also as risk
management service providers. For relatively simple products, reinsurers
may simply act as capital suppliers. As for complex products, such as
underwriting catastrophic risks, reinsurers may take a more active role,
more analogous to product-design consultants, through facultative
reinsurance.55 Since reinsurers deal with different catastrophe lines among
geographic regions in the world, they are in a better position to share their
experiences with the ceding companies. Providing risk management service
for the primary insurers can take several forms: (1) Entry into the market.
Global reinsurers can help potential new market participants remove entry
barriers, especially for those in developing countries, and allow insurers to
enter this new market slowly by initially reinsuring a large portion of their
risks.56 (2) Product design and underwriting assistance. Reinsurers can
supply expert knowledge to new market participants and provide related
data to develop a pricing model for a new product.57 For example, from
1998 to 2002, Swiss Re, cooperating with Beijing Normal University,
completed the Digital Map of China Catastrophe Events, which includes
See e.g., Liquidation of Union Indemn. Ins. Co. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co.,
674 N.E.2d 313, 319-320 (N.Y. 1996).
53
See e.g., Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 4 F.3d 1049, 1054
(2d Cir. 1993).
54
Abramovsky, supra note 4, at 383-384 n. 144.
55
Samplatsky, supra note 30, at 26.
56
Patrick Brockett, Robert C. Witt & Paul R. Aird, An Overview of
Reinsurance and the Reinsurance Markets, 9 J. INS. REG. 3, 432, 440-444 (1991).
57
Samplatsky, supra note 30, at 26.
52
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historical data on geography, weather, and so on, since the twelfth
century. 58 This digital map has been very helpful for the pricing of
catastrophe insurance. (3) Claims processing. Reinsurers can review the
basis of insurers’ decisions, and reinsurance contracts allow the reinsurer to
opt out of an insurer’s decision to deny coverage. The judgment of a
reinsurer typically provides guidance to ceding insurers that can prevent
violations of unfair claims practices acts.59
D.

INDIRECT REGULATION OF INSUREDS

Besides primary insurers, reinsurers may even regulate behaviors
of insureds and control their moral hazard.60 Generally speaking, reinsurers
have no direct contract relationship with the insureds. Because reinsurers
and insureds are parties to a secondary indemnity agreement, reinsurers do
not usually pay the original insureds. 61 However, under the fronting
agreement arrangement, 62 the reinsurer might have the opportunity to
regulate the insureds, even indirectly. The main purpose of the fronting
agreement is to allow a reinsurer who is not locally licensed to do
business.63 One New York court described a fronting agreement as an
arrangement where an insurer issued a policy on a risk “with an
58
XI GUO & XINJIANG WEI, The Difficulties and Solutions for Issuing
Catastrophe Bonds in China, 8 FRONTIERS L. CHINA 521, 550-553 (2013) (2005).
59
Samplatsky, supra note 30, at 35-39.
60
The reinsurer has strong incentives to regulate the insureds. Some primary
insurance policy includes “cut-out” provisions which allow a direct action by the
insureds against the reinsurer. “Cut-out” provisions allow “an endorsement to an
insurance policy or reinsurance contract which provides that, in the event of the
insolvency of the insurance company, the amount of any loss which would have
been recovered from the reinsurer by the insurance company (or its statutory
receiver) will be paid instead directly to the policyholder, claimant, or other payee,
as specified by the endorsement, by the reinsurer.” See REINSURANCE ASS’N OF
AM., Fundamentals of Property and Casualty Reinsurance, 32 (2016),
http://www.reinsurance.org/files/public/07FundamentalsandGlossary1.pdf.
61
DAVID M. RAIM, JOY L. LANGFORD, DANIEL W. GERBER, AARON J. AISEN &
CHRISTOPHER H. BROWN, NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE §
40.01 (2007).
62
Despite the slightly pejorative terms used in this arrangement, there is
nothing illegal in a domestic insurer acting as a front for the unauthorized insurer.
In fact, so long as all other regulatory goals are met, these relationships can allow
for a significant increase in insurance capacity. See RAIM ET AL., supra note 61, at
§40.04(5).
63
Union Sav. Am. Life Ins. Co. v. North Central Life Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp.
481, 484 (S. D. Miss. 1993).

304

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 23

understanding that another party will insure it.” 64 Therefore, the risks
underwritten by a primary insurer who has made the fronting agreement
with a reinsurer will be assumed in the end by the reinsurer.65 In other
words, the reinsurer will be responsible for the entire amount that it is
required to pay under the original policy. Generally, the licensed insurer
will receive a fee for acting as the “front,”66 while the reinsurers can act as
insurers to regulate insureds through risk-based pricing, contract design,
claims management, and refusal to insure.
IV.

REASONS FOR GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED
REINSURANCE FOR CATASTROPHES

The previous section explored the main regulatory techniques of
reinsurance which control primary insurers’ moral hazard and offer them
incentives to underwrite approprately and mitigate risk. This leads to the
issue of how government-provided reinsurance works and how it differs
from regulation by private reinsurance. Before answering these questions, a
prerequisite discussion should be why the government is involved in
catastrophe reinsurance and why not leave all catastrophe reinsurance to
the private market. The main rationale offered to justify governments’
sponsoring catastrophe insurers and acting as reinsurers of catastrophe risks
is the imperfections of private reinsurance.
Underwriting cycles show the imperfection of private reinsurance.
The phenomenon of the underwriting cycle, which refers to the tendency of
insurance markets to go through alternating phases of “hard” and “soft”
markets, is an important characteristic of insurance markets. 67 Hard
markets are usually triggered by capital depletions resulting from
underwriting catastrophic losses of unexpected magnitude. 68 Figure 3
shows the infamous cyclical nature of property-casualty insurance from the
Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Excess Ins. Co., 970 F. Supp. 265, 267 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
65
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Shriver, Inc., 224 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2000)
(describing a fronting agreement as a “well-established ad perfectly legal scheme”
where policies are issued by state-licensed insurance companies and then
immediately reinsured to 100 percent of face value).
66
Venetsanos v. Zucker, Facher & Zucker, 638 A.2d 1333, 1337 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1994).
67
Hard market leads to decreased supply but increased premium whereas in a
soft market, coverage supply is plentiful and prices decline. See DAVID CUMMINS
& OLIVIER MAHUL. CATASTROPHE RISK FINANCING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
PRINCIPLES FOR PUBLIC INTERVENTION, 55 (2009).
68
Cummins, supra note 5, at 179-220.
64
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years following 1989. It clearly indicates that reinsurance prices are
cyclical.69 The hard market in the 1990s was caused by Hurricane Andrew
(1992). The magnitude of losses from Andrew took insurers by surprise,
and thirteen insurance companies even went bankrupt primarily as a result
of capital depletions. 70 After the catastrophe, insurance companies
improved loss estimation and risk management capabilities; insurers and
catastrophe modeling firms revised upward their expectations of future
hurricane losses.71 Accordingly, prices of reinsurance increased for the
1993 renewals.
Figure 3. US catastrophe reinsurance: rate on line index72

To some extent, reinsurers are facing similar financing limitations
to those faced by primary insurers.73 During periods of hard markets, there
Reinsurance prices increased and supply contracted following the 1992
Hurricane Andrew, paralleling the market response to later 2005 hurricane seasons.
70
A.M. Best Company, 2006 Annual Hurricane Study: Shake, Rattle, and
Roar (May 2006).
71
Cummins, supra note 5, at 192.
72
The rate on line is a pricing concept, which is found by dividing the
contractual reinsurance premium by the reinsurance limit and converting the result
into a percentage. See Kenneth Froot, The Intermediation of Financial Risks:
Evolution in the Catastrophe Reinsurance Market, 11 RISK MGMT. AND INS. REV.
281, 281-294 (2008);
73
Many primary insurers do not have enough capital and surplus themselves
to survive catastrophes, and they have to rely upon the reinsurance market to
recompense catastrophic damages. See VERONIQUE BRUGGEMAN, COMPENSATING
69
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is often insufficient reinsuring capacity. Why are so few assets allocated to
catastrophe reinsurance? Since the market distortions appear to be more
supply- (reinsurer) than demand- (primary insurer) related,74 explanations
for imperfections in the reinsurance market mainly consider supply
restrictions. The explanations below are well documented in the law and
economics literature.
First, informational asymmetries between capital providers and
reinsurers about exposure levels and reserve adequacy can result in high
costs of capital during hard markets. 75 It might be more costly for
reinsurers to raise additional funds since capital providers cannot clearly
separate performance into event losses and reinsurers’ skill in peril
selection.76 Irrational investor behavior, such as investor “trend following,”
may also decrease the supply of capital to reinsurance after a major
catastrophe.77 The consensus in the economics literature is that shortages
are driven by capital market and insurance market imperfections that
prevent capital from flowing freely into and out of the reinsurance
corporations in response to catastrophic losses.78
A major catastrophe may deplete reinsurer capital and surplus, and
require some time to replenish.79 Without additional funds from capital
providers, such depletion of equity capital is likely to result in raised
premiums for reinsurance, which are above the expected loss of such

CATASTROPHE VICTIMS: A COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH 136
(2010).
74
According to a set of demand–supply equilibrium points, graphed in terms
of price and quantity of reinsurance provided, Froot shows a strong negative
correlation between price and quantity supplied emerges. It suggests that supply
shocks are the main driver rather than demand—a decline in supply results in an
increase in price and decline in quantity of risk transfer. See Froot, supra note 72.
75
CUMMINS & MAHUL, supra note 67, at 194.
76
Kenneth Froot, The Market for Catastrophe Risk: A Clinical Examination,
60 J. OF FIN. ECON. 529, 529–571 (2001).
77
Investor trend following refers to the situation that investors expect recent
performance to continue, as a result, they tend to buy exposures that have recently
performed well and to sell those that have not. Id.
78
Ralph Winter, The Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets, 3 J. OF FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 379–415 (1994); David Cummins & Patricia M. Danzon, Price
Shocks and Capital Flows in Liability Insurance, J. OF FIN. INTERMEDIATION 6 (1):
3–38 (1997); David Cummins & Neil A. Doherty, Capitalization of the
Property-Liability Insurance Industry: Overview, J. OF FIN. SERVICES RES. 21 (1–
2): 5–14 (2002); CUMMINS & MAHUL, supra note 67, at 194.
79
Froot, supra note 72, at 285.
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coverage.80 Using empirical evidence from the year following Hurricane
Andrew for those insurers that had greater exposure to the southeastern
United States and to hurricanes wherever they occur, Froot demonstrates
that reinsurance “prices rise most where quantities decline most.”81
Second, reinsurers may have market power, and supply shortages
and high prices after catastrophes may occur because reinsurers have no
incentive to increase their capital. By putting less money at risk and
preventing new entry, incumbent reinsurers keep prices high.82 The former
Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner argued that market power among
reinsurers is the main reason that catastrophe reinsurance has proved more
profitable than insurance.83 Barriers to entry are also relevant to the market
power story.84 The absence of entry barriers tends to suggest that there is
no market power; it is entry barriers that permit sellers to keep prices above
marginal costs. Froot has provided empirical evidence to support the
hypothesis that there was considerable entry into the reinsurance market in
the 1990s.85
Third, the corporate form of reinsurance ownership may also
contribute to short supply in the reinsurance market in the wake of
catastrophes. 86 Corporations create agency costs because managers’
(“agents”) interests may not perfectly align with those of shareholders
(“principals”). Managers act in many ways that do not maximize the
corporation’s value, but instead advance their personal financial interests.87

Frank A. Sloan & Lindsey M. Chepke, Reinsurance, in MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 247, 252-253 (2008).
81
Froot, supra note 76.
82
Froot, supra note 76, at 559.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 560.
85
Froot notes that the 1990s were not crisis years, but sellers could have been
poised for entry when and if prices of reinsurance rose. Id.
86
Froot, supra note 72, at 287. See HOWARD KUNREUTHER, MARK V. PAULY
& THOMAS RUSSELL, DEMAND AND SUPPLY SIDE ANOMALIES IN CATASTROPHE
INSURANCE MARKETS: THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS, Paper
prepared for the MIT/LSE/Cornell Conference on Behavioral Economics 17-18
(2004) (suggesting that capital suppliers may believe that the high losses they
experienced are not random which reflects reinsurer mismanagement).
87
Froot, supra note 76, at 567; Frank A. Sloan & Lindsey M. Chepke,
Reinsurance, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, 247-276, 253 (2008).
80
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GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED CATASTROPHE
REINSURANCE PROGRAMS: EXAMPLES

Section III described the tools available to reinsurers in regulating
insurers and the underwritten catastrophe risks. We saw that through
contract design (loss-sensitive premiums), utmost good faith, providing risk
management service, and indirect regulation of insureds, reinsurance has
the capacity to perform a social function that is regulatory in nature: less
moral hazard on the part of primary insurers and better preparedness on the
part of insureds. Section IV explained why much of the reinsurance for
catastrophe risks in the world is sponsored by the government. Compared
with the capital shortfall of private reinsurers, the government can channel
capital effectively and quickly after catastrophes since it can raise money
through taxes or borrow money by issuing debt or government bonds.88
This part examines how government-sponsored reinsurance programs
work. Government-sponsored reinsurance is increasingly welcomed by law
and economics scholarship as a way to manage catastrophic risks. 89
Meanwhile, government-sponsored reinsurance has increased substantially
in practice, and many programs are often established when
primary-insurance markets break down. It is not possible within the scope
of this Article to critically analyze all of the programs that exist, some of
which were mentioned in the introduction. Accordingly, this discussion
will be limited to the French CCR, the Japanese JERS and the Turkish
TCIP. As these examples demonstrate, there is wide variation in the nature
and extent of regulation through catastrophe reinsurance across different
countries.
Government-sponsored reinsurance is a kind of public-private
partnership that marries the merits of both government and reinsurance.90
The origins of such partnerships can be traced to the nuclear liability
conventions which emerged in the 1960s. 91 Government-sponsored
reinsurance programs have since expanded to many lines of insurance,
Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 258-259.
See e.g., Bruggeman, Faure & Heldt, supra note 4, at 212; Howard
Kunreuther & Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Managing Catastrophic Risks through
Redesigned Insurance: Challenges and Opportunities, In HANDBOOK OF INS., 517,
523 (George Dionne ed., 2013); Bruggeman, Faure & Fiore, supra note 5, at 374.
90
Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Rules Rather than Discretion: Lessons
from Hurricane Katrina, 33 J. OF RISK & UNCERTAINTY 101, 1112-113 (2006);
Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism--and Crime, 102
MICH. L. REV. 268, 314 (2003).
91
The Price-Anderson Act, concerning nuclear facilities, is an example of this
model. See Bruggeman, Faure & Fiore, supra note 89, at 376.
88
89
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including medical malpractice,92 expropriation insurance,93 crop insurance
programs, 94 and terrorism insurance after the September 11 terrorism
attack.95 Since the government has substantial credit capacity due to its
ability to raise money through tax or borrow money by issuing debt far
more readily than private insurers or reinsurers,96 it is widely recognized
that the government can help address catastrophic risks in some respects,
and can thus be used to support the failures of the primary insurance
market.97
A.

THE FRENCH CCR

The French government-sponsored reinsurance for natural disasters
takes the form of subsidized government reinsurance with mandatory
private primary insurance. 98 In France, private insurers offered little
For example, New Jersey enacted the New Jersey Medical Malpractice
Reinsurance Association in 1976, and any member of the association could be
approved by the association to write malpractice coverage. The insurer would then
be reinsured by the association either in full or in part. See Vincent R. Zarate, N.J.
Malpractice Unit Activated, J. OF COM. 9 (1977).
93
For example, in the U.S., expropriation insurance written by the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) was a purely governmental program, and
eventually OPIC turned the program over to private insurers, with OPIC
functioning only as a reinsurer. See Bernard Webb, Reinsurance as a Social Tool,
in ISSUES IN INS. 279, 326 (1984).
94
For example, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) is authorized
to provide reinsurance for “all risks” crop written by private insurers. See 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N., 5949.
95
After 11 September 2001, when airline risks became more difficult to
insure, the U.S. federal government guaranteed insurance coverage. See Kenneth
Abraham, United States of America. Liability for Acts of Terrorism under US Law
in TERRORISM, TORT L. AND INS.: A COMP. SURVEY, 176–188 (B. A. Koch ed.
2004).
96
Louis Kaplow, Incentives and Government Relief for Risk, 4 J. OF RISK AND
UNCERTAINTY 167, 167-175 (1991).
97
See John V. Jacobi, Government Reinsurance Programs and
Consumer-Driven Care, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 537 (2005); Daniel A. Schenck, Next
Step for Brownfields Government Reinsurance of Environmental Cleanup Policies,
10 CONN. INS. L.J. 401 (2003); Mark A. Hall, Government-Sponsored Reinsurance,
19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 465 (2010); Bruggeman, Faure & Heldt, supra note 89, at
39; Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 89, at 517, 546.
98
Lorilee Medders, Kathleen McCullough & Verena Jäger, Tale of Two
Regions: Natural Catastrophe Insurance and Regulation in the United States and
the European Union, 30 J. INS. REG. 171, 184 (2011).
92
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coverage for natural catastrophe risks, and the government intervened
through ad hoc assistance in the aftermath of disasters until 1982.99 The
1982 disaster law required private insurers to underwrite catastrophic risks
and permitted them to cede those risks to CCR, the state-guaranteed
reinsurer.100 To gain the benefit of the government guarantee, CCR pays an
annual “premium” to the government (Article R. 431-16-2 Insurance
Code), similar to private retrocession.101
CCR provides a coverage system which compounds twofold layers
based on two separate treaties: a 50 percent quota share treaty and a
stop-loss treaty with an unlimited governmental guarantee.102 Those risks
not covered by the quota share treaty are subject to the stop-loss treaty. The
stop-loss treaty with an unlimited governmental guarantee enables primary
insurers to underwrite high severity hazards.
Loss-Sensitive Premiums. Loss-sensitive premiums require that
reinsurance premiums should reflect an actuarially fair cost and reinsured
losses. CCR offered coverage on identical terms and a rather low price to
all ceding companies in the first fifteen years as a result of benefits from an
unlimited guarantee from the French Treasury.103 In 1997, CCR revised its
reinsurance terms because of the deterioration of the claims figures and
changes in the primary insurance market. It began to move forward to
loss-sensitive premiums setting, and its rating of the “stop-loss” covers was
decided based upon each individual insurer’s loss record.104
Such loss-sensitive premiums setting represents a good start, but it
still has a long way to go. With the governmental guarantee, CCR charges
relatively lower premiums to primary insurers than other private
reinsurance companies and thus crowds them out of the market.105 On the
99
David Moss, Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster
Policy since 1803, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., 307, 345 (Kenneth A. Froot, eds.
1999).
100
Decree No. 82-706 of 10 August 1982 on the Reinsurance Operations for
the Natural Catastrophe Risks by the Caisse Centrale de Re´assurance.
Application of Article 4 of the Act No. 82-600 of 13 July 1982, JORF 11 August
1982. See Bruggeman, Faure & Fiore, supra note 5, at 379-380.
101
Suzanne Vallet, Insuring the Uninsurable: The French Natural
Catastrophe Insurance System, in Catastrophe Risk and Reinsurance: A Country
Risk Management Perspective, 199, 206 (Eugene N. Gurenko ed. 2004).
102
Medders, McCullough & Jäger, supra note 98, at 184.
103
Vallet, supra note 101, at 211.
104
Such price setting does not include quota share treaty. Id. at 211-212.
105
Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Catastrophe Economics: The National Flood
Insurance Program, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 165, 183-184 (2010) (“The CCR is not a
monopolistic disaster reinsurer. In fact, there are several reinsurers writing business
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other hand, it will be the taxpayers who ultimately pay CCR’s unlimited
coverage that can offset damages. 106 France’s relatively moderate
exposure to natural disasters makes the operation of CCR suitable to
France. It is still questionable to what extent CCR is capable of dealing
with the next mega-catastrophe.
The Duty of Utmost Good Faith. The duty of utmost good faith is
enforced by two mechanisms in the operation of CCR. First, the 50 percent
quota share treaty of CCR contributes to primary insurers’ performance of
the duty of utmost good faith. Primary insurers have to retain half of the
risks themselves under the 50 percent quota share treaty, which gives them
an incentive to underwrite appropriately. 107 Second, the long-term
relationship between CCR and the ceding companies also contributes to the
performance of the duty of utmost good faith. As the state-guaranteed
reinsurer, CCR has operated several decades and has abundant records of
the ceding companies. Such experiences help CCR effectively monitor
primary insurers’ performance of utmost good faith.
Providing Risk Management Service. It is unclear whether CCR
provides risk management services for the ceding companies. Nonetheless,
as one of the top twenty reinsurance carriers in the world with an AAA
rating from Standard & Poor’s, CCR clearly has expertise in risk
management. 108 Dealing with ceding companies of different sizes,
differing legal forms, and various types of portfolios, CCR is in a better
position to share its experiences in managing catastrophe risk and
providing coverage for multiple types of natural hazards.
Indirect Regulation of Insureds. Since CCR is licensed to conduct
business in France, there is no need for a fronting agreement arrangement.
There is no empirical evidence of its indirect regulation of insureds.
B.

THE JAPANESE JERS

The Japanese government-sponsored reinsurance for earthquakes
takes the form of the government providing reinsurance capacity. JERS
was established based on the Act on Earthquake Insurance in 1966 enacted
after the Niigata earthquake in 1964.109 Primary insurers issue standard
with primary reinsurers in France.”); see Medders, McCullough & Jäger, supra
note 98, at 184.
106
Medders, McCullough & Jäger, supra note 98, at 185.
107
Suzanne Vallet, The French Experience in the Management and
Compensation of Large scale Disasters, in CATASTROPHIC RISKS AND INS. 293, 300
(2005).
108
Medders, McCullough & Jäger, supra note 98, at 184.
109
OECD, DISASTER RISK FINANCING IN APEC ECONOMIES 73 (2013),
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residential policies which cover losses to personal dwellings and contents
caused by earthquakes and volcanic eruptions and then cede these risks to
JERS.110JERS is a specialized reinsurance company but backed by the
Japanese government. It can also be seen as an earthquake reinsurance
pool, retaining a portion of the liability and retroceding the rest to private
insurers (based on their market share) and to the Japanese government
through reinsurance treaties.111 To be clear, JERS only covers personal
residential, not commercial, earthquake insurance.
The professional reinsurance business operations are all managed
by JERS, not the Japanese government. Nevertheless, the successful
operation of JERS depends on a commitment from the Japanese
government, which provides significant reinsurance capacity as a last
resort. 112 It can be illustrated by the aggregate limit of indemnity for
earthquake insurance liabilities (JPY 6.2 trillion), which is shared by the
private insurers and the government among different layers. The first layer,
which covers earthquake insurance liabilities up to JPY 85 billion, is totally
compensated by JERS; the second layer, which covers earthquake
insurance liabilities over JPY 85 billion and up to JPY 348.8 billion, is
compensated by equal contributions by the Japanese government (50
percent) and JERS and private insurers (due to retroceded risk from JERS;
50 percent); and the third layer, which covers earthquake insurance
liabilities from JPY 348.8 billion to JPY 6.2 trillion, is mostly compensated
by the Japanese government (99.6 percent) and a very small share by
private insurers (0.4 percent) (Figure 4).113 If the earthquake insurance
liabilities of one peril exceed JPY 6.2 trillion, residential policyholders’
claims are reduced proportionately following the provisions of the Act on
Earthquake Insurance.114

http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/insurance/OECD_APEC_DisasterRiskFinancing.pdf.
110
Yuichi Takeda, Government as Reinsurers of Last Resort: The Japanese
Experience, in CATASTROPHE RISK AND REINSURANCE: A COUNTRY RISK
MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 225-237 (Eugene N. Gurenko eds. 2004).
111
Michael Faure & Jing Liu, The Tsunami of March 2011 and the Subsequent
Nuclear Incident at Fukushima: Who Compensates the Victims, 37 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 129, 149 (2012).
112
Takeda, supra note 110.
113
Id.; OECD, supra note 109.
114
See OECD, supra note 109, at 73.
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Figure 4. Risk allocation under the Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance
Scheme115

Loss-Sensitive Premiums. Making the premiums loss-sensitive is
one of the most challenging tasks for a public-private partnership. This is
no exception for JERS. The reinsurance price of JERS is not market-based
but determined by the Japanese government. The premiums are not
loss-sensitive, but set to follow a general fair-value principle.116
The Duty of Utmost Good Faith. Primary insurers’ duty of utmost
good faith is extremely important for JERS. The primary insurers could
cede 100 percent of the underwritten earthquake insurance exposure to
JERS.117 If primary insurers underwrite inappropriately, JERS will assume
all the bad risks. According to the requirement of utmost good faith, the
primary insurers should disclose all material facts which may affect the
subject risk. In order to enforce such a requirement, the Japanese
government stipulated that all rating work is set solely by the
Non-Life-Insurance Rating Organization of Japan (NLIRO) and not by
primary insurers.118 The NLIRO has to file materials setting, modifying
and revising the base rates to the Financial Supervisory Authority for
Id.
Currently the details of JER reinsurance contracts are not fully disclosed,
except the names of the counterparties and the amount of reinsurance. It is difficult
to supply the basic elements of the general fair-value principle. Some anecdotes
from the Japanese insurance industry imply that affordability and sustainability are
both important considerations of this principle. See Takeda, supra note 110, at 231.
117
THE GENEVA ASSOCIATION, INSURERS’ CONTRIBUTIONS TO DISASTER
REDUCTION—A SERIES OF CASE STUDIES 7, 48 (Meghan Orie & Walter R. Stahel
eds., 2013).
118
Takeda, supra note 110, at 230-231.
115
116
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approval.119 Under this approach, JERS is able to access the underwriting
materials of its ceding companies. Besides this arrangement, the duty of
utmost good faith is also enforced by reinsurance treaty provisions. The
Earthquake Reinsurance Treaty between JERS and private insurance
companies includes the retrocession provision, which provides that primary
insurers cede their underwritten risks to JERS, and JERS in turn retrocedes
the risks in the second layer to the primary insurers and the Japanese
government with equal portion.120 Retroceding 50 percent of the risk in the
second layer to primary insurers contributes to their performance of the
duty of utmost good faith.
Providing Risk Management Service. One purpose of establishing
JERS is to facilitate loss mitigation and a recovery process through the
insurance industry. However, in practice, the NLIRO, rather than JERS,
undertakes major service works for primary insurers.
Indirect Regulation of Insureds. Since JERS is licensed to conduct
business in Japan, there is no need for a fronting agreement. JERS has
incentives to regulate insureds’ behavior and awareness of earthquake risks
because primary insurers cede 100 percent of the risks to JERS. For
example, JERS uses deductibles to enhance individuals’ risk mitigation
efforts.121
C.

THE TURKISH TCIP

Compared to CCR and JERS, the Turkish government does not
establish a specific reinsurance company to assume catastrophe risk. The
Turkish government provides contingent liquidity support when the
payments of claims exceed TCIP’s capacity.122 It could be regarded as
reinsurance since it is the last resort. The first layer reinsurance
arrangement under the mechanisms of TCIP is the international reinsurers,
which assume the transferred risks from TCIP. Therefore, the regulatory
techniques of reinsurance include both international reinsurers and the
Turkish government.
Id. at 234.
K. KAWACHIMARU, NON-LIFE INSURANCE RATING ORGANIZATION OF
JAPAN, Disaster Risk Management in Japan, in CATASTROPHIC RISKS AND
INSURANCE 303, 318 (2005).
121
If the premium exceeds $550 per policy, this amount is the deductible;
otherwise the deductible is equal to the premium of the policy. See Youbaraj Paudel,
A Comparative Study of Public-Private Catastrophe Insurance Systems: Lessons
from Current Practices, 37 GENEVA PAPERS 257, 278 (2012).
122
EUGENE GURENKO, EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE IN TURKEY: HISTORY OF THE
TURKISH CATASTROPHE INSURANCE POOL, xi-xii (2006).
119
120
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In 1999, Governmental Decree Law No. 587 on Compulsory
Earthquake Insurance (“Decree Law”) came into force and gave birth to
TCIP in the aftermath of the devastating Marmara earthquake.123 TCIP is a
public-private partnership (Figure 5). Insurance companies act as agents to
TCIP and cede 100 percent of all risks acquired by TCIP, and they receive
a commission from the pool. 124 TCIP transfers risks to international
reinsurers through sharing pools under the management of international
reinsurance companies, like Munich Re.125 The claims payment of TCIP is
dependent on international reinsurance and on the amount of funds
collected (partially from the government). 126 The board of directors
represents the government, experts, and insurance companies. The
administrative body of TCIP is the General Directorate of Insurance within
the Prime Ministry Under-Secretariat of the Treasury, but the business
operation is managed by Milli Reasürans (“operational manager”), a
national reinsurance company.127

Id. at 87-95.
See Johann-Adrian von Lucius, A Reinsurer’s Perspective on the Turkish
Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP), in CATASTROPHE RISK AND REINSURANCE: A
COUNTRY RISK MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 217, 219 (Eugene N. Gurenko, eds.
2004) (stating that the TCIP supplies earthquake insurance to homeowners, and
covers losses caused by earthquakes and earthquake-related catastrophes, such as
fires, explosions, landslides, and tsunamis); Burcak Başbuğ-Erkan & Ozlem
Yilmaz, Successes and Failures of Compulsory Risk Mitigation: Re-evaluating the
Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool, 39 DISASTERS 782, 789 (2015).
125
Başbuğ-Erkan & Yilmaz, supra note 124, at 782.
126
It would only be triggered by an event equivalent to an earthquake in
Istanbul with a 200-year return period (technically, an earthquake with an
exceedance probability of 0.5 percent). See GURENKO, supra note 122, at xi.
127
Başbuğ-Erkan & Yilmaz, supra note 124. All of its business
functions—from sales to reinsurance to claim management—are subcontracted to
the private insurance industry, and the TCIP has no public employees. See
GURENKO, supra note 122.
123
124

316

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 23

Figure 5. Organizational chart of the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance
Pool128

Loss-Sensitive Premiums. Since the business operation of TCIP
follows a market-oriented approach, and its underwritten risks are
transferred to international reinsurers, it is reasonable for international
reinsurers to charge loss-sensitive premiums to control the moral hazard of
TCIP. Loss-sensitive premiums require that reinsurance premiums should
reflect an actuarially fair cost, and they constrain TCIP to underwrite
appropriately. With the burden from the reinsurance, TCIP adopts a
differential risk-based pricing approach and imposes construction
maintenance obligations on the insured in the policies to mitigate
underwritten losses.129
The Duty of Utmost Good Faith. Primary insurers play a different
role in TCIP compared to their role in the French CCR or the Japanese
JERS. Primary insurers act as agents to TCIP, and the pool assumes all the
earthquake risks. 130 The duty of utmost good faith is not suitable for
primary insurers. In contrast, TCIP transfers risk to international reinsurers.
Başbuğ-Erkan & Yilmaz, supra note 124.
Article 14 of Governmental Decree Law No. 587 on Compulsory
Earthquake Insurance (“The owner who causes or allows the building and each
independent section thereof to be altered contrary to the related design and in a
way that will affect the load-bearing system, loses his entitlement to compensation
in as much as the actual loss arises or increases because of such reason.”).
130
von Lucius, supra note 124.
128
129
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From the perspective of international reinsurers, it requires TCIP to
perform the duty of utmost good faith. The organizational structure of
TCIP, to some extent, might guarantee its performance through
public-private partnership.
Providing Risk Management Service. Reinsurers play an important
role as consultants, especially in the conception of TCIP. As a matter of
fact, TCIP was formed with the cooperation of the World Bank, the
Turkish Government, Milli Re, reinsurance brokers, and Munich Re.131
International reinsurers play an important role in providing risk
management services and contribute to the operation of TCIP and
catastrophe risk management in Turkey.
Indirect Regulation of Insureds. Since international reinsurers, such
as Munich Re, are licensed to conduct business in Turkey, there is no need
for a fronting agreement arrangement. There is no empirical evidence that
TCIP indirectly regulates insureds.
D.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Controlling moral hazard and providing incentives to loss control
benefit both reinsurers and primary insurers. Such efforts will encourage
ceding companies to regulate behaviors of policyholders, decrease cost for
ceding companies, and enhance profits for reinsurers. It is a win-win
strategy for both reinsurers and primary insurers. Compared to private
reinsurers, government-sponsored reinsurance meets more challenges to
fulfill regulatory techniques due to political pressures and other constraints.
Table 1 summarizes the regulation by government-sponsored reinsurance
among the three countries in the preceding discussion.

WORLD FORUM OF CATASTROPHE PROGRAMMES, NATURAL CATASTROPHES
INSURANCE COVER: A DIVERSITY OF SYSTEMS 163-164 (2008).
http://www.wfcatprogrammes.com/c/document_library/get_file?folderId=13442&n
ame=DLFE-553.pdf.
131
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Table 1. Comparison of regulation by government-sponsored reinsurance

Loss-sensitive
premiums

Partially

Japanese
JERS
No

The duty of
utmost good
faith
Providing risk
management
services

Yes

Yes

Probably

Not clear

Not clear

Yes

Indirect
regulation of
insureds

No

Yes

No

French CCR

Turkish TCIP
Yes

This table shows that no government-sponsored reinsurance fully
performs regulatory techniques. It seems that the Turkish TCIP is subject to
less moral hazard than the French CCR and the Japanese JERS. TCIP cedes
risks to international reinsurers following a loss-sensitive premiums
approach and thus has more incentives to underwrite appropriately, such as
identifying “bad risks,” enforcing building codes, and educating the public
to raise their awareness to catastrophe risk. Meanwhile, international
reinsurers not only helped found TCIP, but also worked as consultants to
supply risk management services. The application of regulatory techniques
of reinsurance helps TCIP work sustainably. For example, TCIP supplies a
model solution, especially for developing and middle-income countries
where rigorous catastrophe risks exist.
Different from TCIP, the French CCR and the Japanese JERS are
both government-sponsored reinsurance institutions and not involved with
other private reinsurance companies. Although they do not adopt
loss-based premiums due to political pressures, they are better in enforcing
primary insurers’ duty of utmost good faith than TCIP. CCR’s system is
particularly suitable to France for several reasons. The first reason is
cultural influence. In France, people value the national solidarity principle
and are tolerant of cross-subsidies between different classes of risk and
different regions, both of which guarantee a single-rate price for
reinsurance. The second reason is social adequacy and affluence. As a
developed and high-income country, the French government has more
capacity to sponsor policyholders. The third reason is the moderate
exposure to disasters. None of the twenty-five worst natural disasters
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recorded, including earthquakes, typhoons, and tsunamis, occurred in
France.132 In addition, during the last several decades (1970–2013), none
of the natural disasters which caused the top ten insured catastrophe losses
occurred in France.133
Japan faces more severe catastrophe risks than France because of
the frequent occurrence of earthquakes and tsunamis. The establishment of
the Japanese JERS is the compromise between the government and the
insurance industry: the government provides reinsurance capacity as a last
resort and facilitates insurance affordability. 134 There is no doubt that
JERS refuses loss-sensitive premiums but follows a general fair-value
principle for price setting. Under such a situation, JERS pays more
attention to monitoring primary insurers’ performance of duty of utmost
good faith and indirect regulation of insureds to control moral hazard and
mitigate losses.
VI.

EXPANDING REGULATION BY
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED CATASTROPHE
REINSURANCE TO CHINA

This Article has reviewed the imperfections of private reinsurance,
mainly due to the apparent shortage of reinsurance capital, especially
during hard markets. Also discussed were government- sponsored
reinsurance programs in France, Japan, and Turkey, which represent both
high-income and middle-income countries. The focus now is to explore the
possibility of expanding regulation by reinsurance to China.
A.

THE ISSUE OF THE GOVERNMENT’S PROVIDING REINSURANCE
CAPACITY IN CHINA

Section IV has explained the imperfections of the private
reinsurance market for catastrophe risks, but these market failures are not
sufficient to justify any and all government intervention: there are many
different forms of government-provided reinsurance, some of which may
be ineffective (no efficiency gains achieved) or even detrimental (causing
efficiency losses).135 One popular approach to government intervention is
Josef, 25 Worst Natural Disasters Ever Recorded, LIST 25 (Aug. 26, 2013),
http://list25.com/25-worst-natural-disasters-recorded/5/.
133
Natural Catastrophes and Man-Made Disasters in 2013: Large Losses from
Floods and Hail; Haiyan Hits the Philippines, SWISS RE 5 (2014),
http://institute.swissre.com/research/overview/sigma/1_2014.html.
134
Takeda, supra note 110.
135
David Cummins & Olivier Mahul, Catastrophe Risk Financing in Developing
132
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to provide a government bailout to victims, including ad hoc direct
payment and establishing compensation funds. This type of ex-post bailout
is known as the Whole-Nation System and generally seen as problematic.136
Another
popular
approach
to
government
intervention
is
government-provided insurance. Compared with ex-post government
bailouts, this type of government intervention looks more attractive, since
an ex-ante insurance approach could accumulate reserves and may provide
incentives to mitigate losses before disasters if associated with risk-based
premiums. However, this type of government intervention is also generally
seen as problematic. 137 Even for China, where private catastrophe
insurance has not yet developed, the government should facilitate private
insurance rather than provide government insurance. The Chinese
government could adopt a reinsurance regime for catastrophes or provide
reinsurance capacity as a last resort. Such arrangements and intervention
provide considerable incentive for primary insurers to control moral hazard
and mitigate losses associated with catastrophic disasters.
Right now, China has begun to stimulate the development of
catastrophe insurance to complement government action in addressing
catastrophe risks. The government’s provision of reinsurance capacity
would also be a response to the concern and demand of private insurers and
reinsurers.
The current insurance industry has few incentives to underwrite
catastrophe risks partly due to scarce insurance and reinsurance capacity. In
2013, the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Communist Party of
China Central Committee promulgated the “Decision of the Central
Countries: Principles for Public Intervention, THE WORLD BANK 76 (2009),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/FINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/CATRISKbook.p
df; see also W. Neil Adger, Nigel Arnell, & Emma Tompkins, Successful adaptation to
climate change across scales, 15(2) Global Environmental Change 85 (2005).
136
Simply speaking, the problems include undercutting potential victims’
incentives for risk prevention and loss mitigation; posing a heavy fiscal burden for
the government and may cause negative distributional effects; leading to political
inefficiencies and etc.
137
For example, government-provided insurance always delivers a subsidy
that private insurance does not give and inflicts two distortions: (1) regressive
redistribution favoring affluent policyholders; and (2) inefficient investment in
residential property by locating too many assets in vulnerable areas. Some scholars
have reviewed and examined two government-provided insurance programs: (1)
the National Flood Insurance Program; and (2) Florida’s state owned Citizens
Insurance, and found that both perceptions of government-provided insurance
performance along two normative metrics: fairness and efficiency, are wrong. See
Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather
Insurance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 571 (2016).
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Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues
concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform,” which expressly
stated that “we will establish an insurance system for catastrophe risks.” In
2014, catastrophe insurance program trials were launched in Shenzhen, in
the Pearl River Delta (a densely populated metropolitan area and also one
of the world’s most disaster-prone regions), and in the Chuxiong region in
the southwestern province of Yunnan, known to be prone to earthquakes.138
However, private catastrophe insurance is one of the least developed lines
in China. For example, after the 2008 Great Sichuan Earthquake, only 0.3
percent of the total losses were covered by insurance companies.139 Private
insurers do not have the capital to fully cover catastrophe losses. The total
capital of China’s property insurance companies is much lower than the
total amount of losses caused by natural disasters. Table 2 shows the
existence of this big gap. Moreover, the China Insurance Regulatory
Commission has implemented China’s Risk-Orientated Solvency System as
of 2015.140 The new solvency regime requires insurers, like the Solvency II
Directive in the European Union, to hold sufficient capital in their reserves,
especially the capital for catastrophe risks that they are facing.141 In order
to underwrite catastrophe risks, insurers have an increasing demand for
more financial capacity and share a significant portion of the insured losses
with reinsurers.

China says testing catastrophe insurance system, REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2014),
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20140820/NEWS04/140829990?AllowView
=VDl3UXk1T3hDUFNCbkJiYkY1TDJaRUt0ajBRV0ErOVVHUT09#.
139
Establishing catastrophe insurance system faces acceleration, CHINA YOUTH
DAILY (March 14, 2011), http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2011-03/14/nw.D110000zgqnb_
20110314_1-05.htm?div=-1.
140
Wenhui Chen, C-ROSS under the Market-oriented Reform and Economy
Globalization, SWISS RE (2014), http://media.swissre.com/documents/CROSS_under_
the_market_ChenWenhui_Dec15.pdf.
141
Id.
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Table 2. Capital of main Chinese property insurers compared to natural
disaster losses (billions of US $)
2007
2008
2009
2010
Net capital of
main insurers

5.5

5.1

6.9

9.0

Natural disaster
losses

38.1

189.5

40.1

86.1

(Source: Yearbook of China Insurance [2008–2011])
Reinsurance is an important potential complement to expanding
primary insurers’ capacity to underwrite risks. However, reinsurance
currently does not provide strong support for catastrophe insurance in
China. At present, the China Reinsurance (Group) Corporation (its
predecessor, the People’s Insurance Company of China Reinsurance, was
created in 1996) is the only domestic reinsurer in China, with consolidated
total assets of around $30 billion and net assets of $8.6 billion.142 Its
capital is much lower than the annual losses caused by natural disasters.
Although China’s reinsurance market has become open to foreign
reinsurance companies after China's entry into the World Trade
Organization, only a few reinsurance companies, such as Swiss Re and
Munich Re, have established business operations in China, and they are
only in the initial stages of reinsuring risks. By 2013, there were only eight
foreign reinsurers who had registered branches in China. 143 When
underwriting catastrophe risks, domestic reinsurers will strongly demand
government sponsorship, which could provide the government with deep
credit capacity.

China Re, Annual Report 2014 (2014) http://www.chinare.com.cn/
zhzjt/resource/cms/2015/08/2015082709085075513.pdf.
143
CPCR, Overview of Chinese Reinsurance Market (May 20, 2013),
https://www.casact.org/education/spring/2013/handouts%5CPaper_1680_handout_
962_0.pdf.
142
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EFFECTIVENESS OF REGULATION BY CATASTROPHE
REINSURANCE

There is little doubt that the government should provide
reinsurance capacity as a last resort to catastrophe risk management in
China. What is less clear is how to apply the proper regulatory techniques,
as discussed in sections III and V. Clearly, catastrophe reinsurance is
closely associated with the operation of primary insurance. As mentioned
above, in 2014, China launched its first catastrophe insurance pilot in
Shenzhen (Shenzhen Model). Therefore, the possibility and feasibility of
regulation by reinsurance in China will be explored through the
examination of its regulatory techniques in the Shenzhen Model.
Shenzhen was selected for the pilot because it has both major
exposure to catastrophe threats144 and a large number of valuable assets.145
The catastrophe insurance framework of the Shenzhen Model includes
three different layers: the first layer is the government catastrophe
insurance assistance, which is bought by the Shenzhen municipal
government, with the beneficiaries being all residents of Shenzhen City; the
second layer is a catastrophe fund mainly sponsored by the Shenzhen
government and social donations; and the third layer is commercial
catastrophe insurance. 146 The first two layers of the Shenzhen Model
represent the social insurance protection. According to the arrangement in
the first layer, the Shenzhen city government buys catastrophe insurance
products from the People's Insurance Company of China (PICC), Shenzhen
branch.147 It has a cap of RMB 2.5 billion with individual claim payments
Frequently occurring disasters in Shenzhen include, but are not limited to,
heavy winds (extending to whole gale, strong gale, and fresh gale), rainstorms,
lightning strikes, floods, waterlogging, tornados, typhoons, tsunamis, hail, landslides,
mudslides, cliff fall, land subsidence, squall lines, and earthquakes of more than 4.5
magnitude. See ICC, Catastrophe Insurance Framework of Shenzhen City (2015),
http://wenku.baidu.com/link?url=oLT1RmQ3BXgfW49ETc-Drhv6S1pOb8dOA5E3Y
OVZgCAkJrTD-aiBaF1doiXOq9Xsb1rLoty4IP-b1dPBKzZY2eiNgZex52GfzpdheyzE
It.
145
Shenzhen is a megacity with approximately 15 million residents. It is
China’s first and one of the most successful Special Economic Zones with its GDP
totaled $260.48 billion in 2014. See Yisha Hou, Promoting the Construction of
Shenzhen Catastrophe Insurance System, 25 DISASTER REDUCTION IN CHINA 42,
42-45 (2015).
146
China says testing catastrophe insurance system, supra note 138.
147
The individuals receiving coverage under the Shenzhen model do not pay
upfront for any losses through deductibles. See Anastasia Telesetsky, Climate
Change Insurance and Disasters: Is the Shenzhen Parametric Social Insurance a
144

324

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 23

of RMB 100,000, and the payments are only available for bodily injury and
death, but not for property damage.148 According to the arrangement in the
second layer, the Shenzhen city government has committed to providing
RMB 36 million of funds annually to support the first layer. The third layer
is related to private insurance and policies that could cover property
damages. In the conception of the Shenzhen Model, reinsurers like the
China Re, Swiss Re, and Taiping Re were involved. Therefore, reinsurance
could and should play its role to control moral hazard of primary insurers
and mitigate losses through relevant regulatory techniques.
Loss-Sensitive Premiums. In the first layer of the Shenzhen Model,
the government buys insurance products from insurance companies (e.g.,
PICC, Shenzhen branch) rather than acting as a reinsurer. PICC cedes a
large portion of underwriting to Swiss Re, China Re, and Taiping Re,
according to the quota share treaties. 149 These treaties provide
loss-sensitive premiums for PICC. Following loss-sensitive premiums,
primary insurers have incentives to control moral hazard and mitigate
losses. PICC has worked in tandem with experts, insureds, and other
stakeholders to identify the technical and economic parameters of
catastrophe risks and develop system-wide technologies of loss prevention.
For example, PICC extracts 5 percent of the premium to organize disaster
research, disaster prevention, disaster emergency relief drills, and disaster
emergency advertising; submits to the government a quarterly report of
current disaster and claims payments and an annual report of disaster risk
management; offers advice on risk prevention, emergency management,
and disaster relief to the municipal government; and establishes and
operates a disaster data base for disaster analysis and prevention. 150
Furthermore, loss-sensitive premiums also induce primary insurers to
regulate policyholder’s behavior for loss mitigation. PICC offers the
Shenzhen government a discounted premium for taking cost-effective
mitigation measures. For example, PICC provides that if the annual loss
ratio (actual payment amount / total premium) is less than 10 percent, then
the premium the following year will be discounted by 10 percent; if the loss
Model for Adaptation?, 43(2) B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 485 (May 31, 2016).
148
Martin Li & Yin Ran, SZ launches 1st disaster insurance, SHENZHEN DAILY
(July 17, 2014), http://szdaily.sznews.com/html/2014-07/10/content_2936724.htm.
149
China Re, Swiss Re, and Taiping Re Underwrite the Shenzhen Catastrophe
Reinsurance Policies, 21ST CENTURY BUS. HERALD (July 6, 2014),
http://xw.sinoins.com/2014-07/16/content_121575.htm.
150
PICC, Catastrophe Insurance Framework of Shenzhen City (2015),
http://wenku.baidu.com/link?url=oLT1RmQ3BXgfW49ETc-Drhv6S1pOb8dOA5E
3YOVZgCAkJrTD-aiBaF1doiXOq9Xsb1rLoty4IP-b1dPBKzZY2eiNgZex52Gfzp
dheyzEIt3.
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ratio is less than 10 percent in two consecutive years, the third year’s
premium will be discounted by 20 percent; if the loss ratio is less than 10
percent in three consecutive years, the fourth year’s premium will be
discounted by 30 percent.151
In the third layer of the Shenzhen Model, the PingAn Insurance
Company starts to design and sell relative catastrophe insurance products to
the residents of Shenzhen.152 There is no doubt that commercial primary
insurers, like PingAn Insurance Company, also have strong incentives to
transfer catastrophe risks to reinsurers. The form of government
sponsorship has not yet been decided in the Shenzhen Model. From the
perspective of control of moral hazard, the approach of TCIP might be a
good choice: the government only provides contingent liquidity support
when the payments of claims exceed insurers’ capacity. If China follows
the model of CCR or JERS, political pressure or other reasons would not
prevent it from repeating their mistakes in subsidizing premiums.
The Duty of Utmost Good Faith. According to the quota share
treaty between insurers and reinsurers, it could contribute to PICC’s
performance of the duty of utmost good faith, since PICC has to retain
some portion of the risks itself. In contrast, the typical long-term
relationship mechanism between insurers and reinsurers, which is closely
associated with utmost good faith may not be workable in the Shenzhen
Model. The current Shenzhen Model is a temporary trial project and lacks
legislative provisions. 153 Without explicit legislative provisions, the
prospect of the Shenzhen Model is quite uncertain. The Shenzhen
municipal government may cease to buy catastrophe insurance policies in
future years. If the government does not buy insurance, there is no
opportunity for a long-term relationship between PICC and reinsurers.
Providing Risk Management Services. Like TCIP, reinsurers,
especially international reinsurers like Swiss Re and Munich Re, play an
important role as consultants to provide risk management services in the
conception of the Shenzhen Model. For example, Swiss Re initiated a
Parametric Insurance Solutions for Disaster Relief System Reform research
program in 2013 as a sponsor for the China Development and Research
Foundation.154 This research program helps Swiss Re become a technical
advisor and a leading reinsurer for the Shenzhen Model.155
Id.
Yisha Hou, supra note 145.
153
Shi Xing, Inspirations of Shenzhen catastrophe insurance pilot revelation,
21ST CENTURY BUS. HERALD (Oct. 11, 2014), http://insurance.hexun.com/
2014-10-11/169210867.html.
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Swiss Re Works with Government Bodies in Mitigating Natural Catastrophe
Risks in China, SWISS RE (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.swissre.com/
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CONCLUSION

Government-sponsored reinsurance can not only support failing
catastrophe insurance due to the deep credit capacity of the government.
Considered the corollary of the regulation-by-insurance idea,156 as the title
of this Article suggests, government-sponsored reinsurance can also
regulate primary insurers’ behaviors in risk mitigation and risk
management through reinsurers’ regulatory techniques.
Currently, affected parties of natural disasters, especially the pilot
catastrophe insurers, are demanding government sponsorship of their
catastrophe losses in China. Considering the reform of the Whole-Nation
System, there is a pressing need for the Chinese government to provide
reinsurance capacity as the new government-intervention approach.
Moreover, regardless of which type of government intervention the
Chinese government adopts, it is necessary to exert the role of reinsurance
in regulating primary insurers through reinsurance regulatory techniques.

china/Swiss_Re_works_with_government_bodies_in_mitigating_natural_catastrop
he_risks_in_China.html.
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Liu Ailin, Risks of the First Catastrophe Insurance Policy Are Ceded to
China Re, Swiss Re and CPIC Re, 21ST CENTURY BUS. HERALD (July 16, 2014),
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/insurance/bxdt/20140716/025719714880.shtml.
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Abramovsky, supra note 4 (“Just as insurance is often viewed as having a
regulatory effect on insured industries, so too should reinsurance be considered as
having a regulatory effect on its reinsureds.”).

